1. 04 Aug, 2005 1 commit
    • Benjamin Herrenschmidt's avatar
      [PATCH] Remove suspend() calls from shutdown path · c36f19e0
      Benjamin Herrenschmidt authored
      This removes the calls to device_suspend() from the shutdown path that
      were added sometime during 2.6.13-rc*.  They aren't working properly on
      a number of configs (I got reports from both ppc powerbook users and x86
      users) causing the system to not shutdown anymore.
      I think it isn't the right approach at the moment anyway.  We have
      already a shutdown() callback for the drivers that actually care about
      shutdown and the suspend() code isn't yet in a good enough shape to be
      so much generalized.  Also, the semantics of suspend and shutdown are
      slightly different on a number of setups and the way this was patched in
      provides little way for drivers to cleanly differenciate.  It should
      have been at least a different message.
      For 2.6.13, I think we should revert to 2.6.12 behaviour and have a
      working suspend back.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
  2. 29 Jul, 2005 1 commit
  3. 27 Jul, 2005 1 commit
  4. 26 Jul, 2005 4 commits
  5. 25 Jun, 2005 2 commits
  6. 24 Jun, 2005 1 commit
    • David Howells's avatar
      [PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key · 3e30148c
      David Howells authored
      The attached patch makes the following changes:
       (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
           This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
           another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
           created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.
           Authorisation keys hold two references:
           (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
           	 constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
           	 rendering it of no further use.
           (b) The "authorising process". This is either:
           	 (i) the process that called request_key(), or:
           	 (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
           	      authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
           	      process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
           	      referred to by the new authorisation key.
      	 This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
      	 will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
      	 the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.
       (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
           /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.
       (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
           it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
           calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
           specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
           (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
           This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
           to the authorising process.
       (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
           direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
           keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
           calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
           credentials of the authorising process.
           This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
           to the authorising process.
       (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
           KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
           than the process doing the instantiation.
       (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
           request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
           done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
           constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.
       (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
           process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
           a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
      Signed-Off-By: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-Off-By: default avatarBenoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
  7. 23 Jun, 2005 2 commits
    • Christoph Lameter's avatar
      [PATCH] Optimize sys_times for a single thread process · 71a2224d
      Christoph Lameter authored
      Avoid taking the tasklist_lock in sys_times if the process is single
      threaded.  In a NUMA system taking the tasklist_lock may cause a bouncing
      cacheline if multiple independent processes continually call sys_times to
      measure their performance.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChristoph Lameter <christoph@lameter.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarShai Fultheim <shai@scalex86.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
    • Alan Cox's avatar
      [PATCH] setuid core dump · d6e71144
      Alan Cox authored
      Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl:
      This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
      or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are
      0 - (default) - traditional behaviour.  Any process which has changed
          privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped
      1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible.  The core dump is
          owned by the current user and no security is applied.  This is intended
          for system debugging situations only.  Ptrace is unchecked.
      2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
          readable by root only.  This allows the end user to remove such a dump but
          not access it directly.  For security reasons core dumps in this mode will
          not overwrite one another or other files.  This mode is appropriate when
          adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.
      > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
      No problem to me.
      > >  	if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
      > >  		current->mm->dumpable = 1;
      > Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER?
      Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines
      should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go
      everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used
      as a bool in untouched code)
      > Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something.  Doing that
      > would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too.
      Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat
      rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic
      diff because it is used all over the place.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAlan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
  8. 05 May, 2005 1 commit
  9. 01 May, 2005 3 commits
  10. 16 Apr, 2005 1 commit
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux-2.6.12-rc2 · 1da177e4
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
      even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
      archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
      3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
      git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
      infrastructure for it.
      Let it rip!